Corruption and trade protection: evidence from panel data by Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Suryadipta Roy
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 





Corruption and Trade Protection: 






















FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 
cleared with the author or authors. Corruption and Trade Protection: Evidence from Panel Data 
 
 










This paper provides new estimates of the effects of corruption and poor institutions on 
trade protection.  It exploits data on several measures of trade protection including import 
duty, international trade taxes, and the trade-GDP ratio.  The paper complements the 
literature on the relationship between corruption and trade reform.  It deviates from the 
previous literature in several ways.  First, unobserved heterogeneity among countries 
have been controlled with properly specified fixed effects exploiting the time dimension 
present in the dataset.  Secondly, instead of using tariff and non-tariff barriers, more 
general measures of trade protection have been used. The issue of endogeneity of 
corruption with respect to trade policy has been addressed using proper instruments for 
corruption used in previous studies. Moreover, two separate institutional measures have 
been used in the same regression to estimate their comparative impacts on trade policy. In 
general, we find that corruption and lack of contract enforcement have strong impacts to 
increase trade protection and negative effects on trade openness. 
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The discussion on the effects of corruption on trade policy has its roots in the 
broad literature on the political economy of trade policy.  Given that trade policies often 
deviate from first best solutions, this strand of the literature has focused on the 
endogeneity of trade policy.  The primary explanation in this regard has been that policy 
makers do not maximize national welfare.  They choose trade policies in response to 
demands from the special interest groups. 
Given that trade policy is endogenous, it is natural for capitalist producers in 
import competing sectors to lobby governments for trade barriers, as has been argued 
among others by Olson (1965).  Grossman and Helpman (1994) developed the 
“protection for sale” model where they took into account the strategic interactions 
between the government and the special interest groups.  The outcome of this interaction 
is determined in an equilibrium where the government implements trade policies after 
taking into account the tradeoffs associated with receiving campaign contributions vis-à-
vis reduced consumers’ welfare.  Our paper complements this idea and shows that corrupt 
governments that are more susceptible to lobbying will extend higher levels of trade 
protection.  The level of corruption in an economy can thus serve as a proxy for the 
amenability of the government to lobby pressures and trade policies are inherently more 
likely to be protectionist in corrupt countries.  Our contention is that the level of trade 
protection is positively correlated with the level of corruption and that the latter is an 
important measure of institutional support for special interest groups.  This should raise 
the ability of these groups to successfully lobby for protection.  The paper estimates this 
effect using cross-country regressions over time.  We have addressed the endogeneity of 
  1corruption by suitably instrumenting for it.  The rest of the paper is organized as the 
following.  Section-2 presents the literature review.  Section-3 specifies the econometric 
model we use.  Section-4 discusses the data.  Section-5 presents the results.  Section-6 
concludes.         
 
2. Literature review 
  One of the first papers to address the relationship between corruption and trade 
protection is Krueger (1974), who develops a formal model of rent seeking under 
quantitative restrictions on trade in a competitive framework.  Bhagwati (1982) discussed 
different types of directly unproductive profit seeking activities in a welfare-theoretic 
framework.  Bardhan (1997) presents a survey on the effects of corruption.  Prior 
econometric research linking corruption and trade has mainly focused on the reverse 
causality from trade openness to corruption.  Ades and Di Tella (1999) showed 
corruption to be negatively associated with competition from foreign firms.  Wei (2000) 
showed “natural openness” to be negatively associated with higher corruption levels. 
Treisman (2000) also showed corruption to be associated with exposure to imports and 
exports, but could not find convincing instruments to control for reverse causality from 
corruption to trade openness.  Gatti (2004) investigates whether the presence of barriers 
to international trade and capital flows is associated with higher corruption and suggests 
that the main impact of trade barriers on corruption comes through collusion between 
individuals and customs officials.  Dutt (2006) examines whether trade protection 
increases bureaucratic corruption, while Lee and Azfar (2002) examines the effect of 
corruption on trade reforms.  The latter, to our knowledge, is the only paper that looks at 
  2the effect of corruption on trade policy.  They find higher levels of corruption to be 
associated with higher tariff and non-tariff barriers and conjectured that more corrupt 
countries delay their trade reform programs.  
  Based on Grossman and Helpman (1994) one may expect a positive correlation 
between corruption and trade protection.  The idea is that a kleptocratic government shall 
attach a higher weight on producers’ surplus (relative to consumer surplus) in its welfare 
maximization, given its susceptibility to lobbying pressures.  This would enable import 
competing sectors to more effectively lobby for trade protection.  Bandyopadhayay, 
Lahiri, and Roy (2006) present a theoretical model to explore the effect of asymmetry 
among member nations on the Customs Union (CU) common external tariff.  One of their 
findings is that if nations remain on average equally susceptible to lobbying but the 
spread of their lobbying susceptibilities increases, then the CU tariff will rise. 
Recent cross-country research suggests a negative association between 
investment, economic growth and high levels of corruption (Mauro 1995). Given that 
low-income countries generally tend to be more “closed” towards trade, ex ante we can 
expect corruption to go hand-in-hand with trade protection.  We investigate this 
relationship using unbalanced panel data on corruption and trade protection for a group of 
88 countries over the period 1982-’97.  In general, our results show corruption to 
significantly increase trade protection (or to reduce the level of trade openness).  This 
holds even after we use a set of control variables and account for comprehensive region 
and year fixed effects.  
  Our analysis departs from the existing literature in the following ways.  We are 
the first to provide fairly robust estimates of the effects of corruption on trade protection 
  3(per se), rather than on trade volumes or changes in tariffs.  Secondly, we undertake a 
panel specification using region and time fixed effects, instead of using an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) specification.  Apart from the corruption variable, we have also used a 
variable describing the quality of institutions – “the risk of contract enforcement”, as a 
control variable, along with corruption.  This measure has been used by Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) within the context of a gravity model, where they find lack of contract 
enforcement to significantly reduce international trade.  They argue that strong 
institutional support for trade among high income countries lowers transactions costs and 
consequently allows greater trade between rich countries.  Our specification which uses 
both the corruption and the contract enforcement variable in the same regression allows 
us to make richer predictions in terms of the importance of the institutional indicators on 
trade policy.  
  
3. Econometric specification 
  The existing work on the effect of corruption on trade protection (by Lee and 
Afzar, 2002) bases its results on pooled cross-section estimates and does not account for 
unobserved (or not included) heterogeneity between countries.  In a panel specification, 
OLS estimates generally tend to be biased and inconsistent due to the correlation of the 
regressors with the unobserved fixed effects.  In order to address this problem, we 
explicitly allow for region and time fixed effects in our regressions.  The region fixed 
effects would capture the tendency for countries within a region to organize themselves 
into Free Trade Areas (FTA) or Customs Unions (CU).  A fixed effects model with 
country-specific effects, on the other hand, will not be able to properly identify the 
  4estimates for the most important corruption variable, given little variability of the data 
within groups.  For example, Dutt and Mitra (2005) note this problem.  Moreover, such 
an approach also uses up large degrees of freedom and results in high multicollinearity 
between the country-specific effects and some of the right-hand side variables, thereby 
making the interpretation difficult.  Use of region-specific effects also allows us to 
employ time constant variables as instruments for corruption and contract enforcement, 
something that would not have been possible with country-fixed effects.  Time specific 
effects address the issue of regressor endogeneity due to correlation of the right-hand side 
variables with the error terms in other periods.  They also capture any pattern that the 
countries exhibit as a group over the years, e.g., whether all countries tend to become 
more protectionist or less protectionist (especially since our data cover the period of 
signing the Uruguay Round negotiations and the launching of the WTO).  Our main 
econometric specification is of the form:                          
it it it t j it e X Corruption y + ′ + + + + = β θ γ λ α   (1) 
where,   denotes the level of trade protection in country i at time period t,  it y α  is the 
common intercept term,  s j − λ  are the region-specific effects, and  s t − γ  are the time-
specific effects common to all countries.   -s are the set of control variables in all the 
equations.  Our first point of departure is the introduction of 
it X
j λ  and  t γ  in equation (1). 
The central variable of interest is the corruption variable, our proxy for the susceptibility 
of the government to lobbying pressures.  We also perform robustness checks to test the 
validity of our hypotheses.  In a dynamic context, the level of corruption may be 
endogenous with respect to trade policy.  An improvement in institutions in a country can 
lead to a reduction in bureaucracy which in turn might lead a further lowering of 
  5corruption.  Furthermore, as Rodrik (2000) has argued, trade reforms not only lead to a 
change in import prices but also result in institutional reforms.  Hausman tests that were 
conducted suggest endogeneity of the corruption variable.  Therefore, we performed a 
two-stage least squares estimation, where we instrument the corruption variable by a 
dummy variable indicating whether the country was a British colony.  The British 
colonial heritage dummy has been found to be associated with significantly lower 
corruption in cross-country regressions and has been previously discussed as an 
instrument for corruption in the existing literature (La Porta et al, 1999; Treisman 2000, 
Acemoglu et al. 2001).  We find this variable to be highly significant in all first-stage 
regressions for corruption in the presence of other control variables and hence used it as 
an instrument for corruption in the 2SLS regressions.  This is our second departure from 
the previous literature.  
 
4. Data 
he key independent variable in this study is the International Country Risk    T
Guide’s (ICRG) popular index for corruption in government.  According to Knack and 
Keefer (1995), who used the variable to explain investment and economic growth, lower 
scores for this variable indicate greater likelihood for government officials to demand 
special payments and/or bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange 
controls, tax assessment, policy protection and loans.  This comes fairly close to 
capturing bureaucratic corruption as we have conceptualized it here.  The other measure 
of institutional efficacy that we have used in this study is the repudiation of contracts by 
government that indicates the risk of a contract being annulled by the government due to 
  6indigenization pressures, change of government, or of its priorities.  While the former 
variable is measured on a zero to six scale, the latter is measured on a zero to ten scale, 
where lower scores denote higher corruption levels or higher risk for repudiation of 
contract.   
For ease of interpretation, we rescale both variables such that higher numbers 
indicate
bustness of our 
 greater levels of corruption or lack of contract enforcement.  The measure has 
both its well known advantages and disadvantages.  On the positive side, the ICRG 
measures have more extensive coverage than other survey data.  Moreover, since a single 
survey methodology has been used, it enables us to make cross-country comparisons.  A 
negative is that they are based on subjective assessments and are therefore subject to 
measurement error.  More importantly, it might be possible that the survey respondents 
notice a country to be attracting trade and investments at a rapid rate and hence 
automatically give it a lower corruption rating and vice versa.  Given that we instrument 
for corruption or contract enforcement in our final specifications, we can significantly 
circumvent the issue of measurement error with the corruption variables. 
  We use three different measures of trade policy to test the ro
results as well as to test our hypothesis of the positive effect of corruption on trade 
protection - (a) total import duties collected as a percentage of total imports;  (b) taxes on 
international trade collected as a percentage of total current revenue;  and, (c) trade-GDP 
ratio.  While import duties comprise of all levies collected on goods at the point of entry, 
taxes on international trade is a more general measure of protection and include import 
duties, export duties, profits of export or import monopolies, exchange profits, and 
exchange taxes.  Trade-GDP ratio has been widely used in the literature as a measure of 
  7openness (for example, Sachs and Warner, 1995).  The control variables included in the 
regressions are real per capita gross domestic product, government expenditure-GDP 
ratio, current account balance (as a percentage of GDP), and the size of the country 
denoted by the population size.  Rodrik (1998) had posited a positive correlation between 
an economy’s exposure to international trade and the size of its government expenditure. 
Countries also differ in their trade policies on the basis of their sizes as measured by real 
GDP.  Underdeveloped countries with low levels of GDP might impose higher levels of 
trade protection than high income countries.  Higher levels of current account deficits 
might also lead to imposition of higher levels of tariffs or import duties in order to 
generate tariff revenue.  As Easterly and Rebelo (1993) have argued, poorer countries 
often resort to trade taxation as a means to replenish government revenue.  Population 
size has been introduced in the regressions as a control for country size.  Other than the 
corruption variables, the rest of the data have been obtained from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank for various years.  After eliminating countries with missing 
observations on all the variables, we arrive at an unbalanced panel of 88 countries over 
the time period 1982-’97, with any single country having at least three years of data.  
 
5. Results 
le 1.a provides summary statistics for our variables for the 88-country sample    Tab
and Table 1.b presents the correlation matrix for the corruption variables across the 
different measures of trade restrictions.  OECD countries are generally found to impose 
very low levels of import duties on their imports as compared to the underdeveloped 
countries with the minimum value ranging from 0% for Belgium, Denmark, Spain, 
  8United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, and Romania to a high of around 53% for India.  
The standard deviation is greater for taxes on international trade with the maximum going 
up to almost 75% for Uganda.  The greatest standard deviation across countries is 
displayed by variations in the level of trade-GDP ratio with a low of around 6% for 
Ghana to a high of over 400% for Singapore.  In general, advanced countries tend to have 
low levels of protection as is apparent in the second table.  Import duty, export duty, and 
international trade tax are all negatively correlated with the level of real GDP while the 
trade-GDP ratio is positively correlated with real GDP.  Levels of trade protection, 
measured by the two indicators are positively correlated with the level of corruption and 
the lack of contract enforcement.  On the other hand, the level of openness determined by 
the trade-GDP ratio is negatively correlated with the levels of corruption and contract 
enforcement.  Both the institutional variables are negatively correlated with the level of 
real GDP, government expenditure, and current account deficit.  The level of trade 
openness is positively correlated with real GDP, government expenditure, and the current 
account balance.   
  Table 2 presents the OLS estimates of the effect of corruption on trade protection 
(with and without control variables).  While corruption appears with the correct sign in 
all the regressions, the variable loses significance when control variables are introduced 
in the regression on import duty.  The variable is positive and significant for trade tax, 
while it is negative and significant in the case of trade-GDP ratio.  The OLS regressions 
also show the low-income countries to have higher levels of trade protection in all the 
regressions.  The middle-income countries are found to have higher levels of import 
  9duties and lower levels of trade-GDP ratio in comparison to the high-income countries 
(the excluded dummy variable in our regressions). 
Given that OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent in panel regressions, we use 
the fixed effects specification given in equation (1) in order to control for individual 
heterogeneity in estimation.  The results for the fixed region-and-time-effects are 
presented in Table 3.  In case of the import duty, corruption is still not significant while it 
is significant in case of the trade tax and the trade-GDP ratio.  For the international trade 
tax, a one standard-deviation increase in corruption is associated with a 0.096 standard 
deviation increase in the tax.  Trade tax is also negatively correlated with real GDP, 
government expenditure, current account balance, and population.  In the regression on 
trade openness, a one standard-deviation increase in the level of corruption is associated 
with a 0.23 standard deviation reduction in the trade-GDP ratio.  However, real GDP, 
government expenditure, and the level of current account balance are not significant with 
respect to the level of openness.  The population variable is significant and negative, 
showing that an increase in the population size reduces the level of openness.  
  As discussed above, there might be an issue of endogeneity between the level of 
corruption and trade protection in a cross-country context. Keeping this in mind, 
Hausman tests were conducted that rejected the null hypotheses of exogeneity of the 
corruption variable.  We took care of this endogeneity by instrumenting for corruption in 
a two-stage least squares regression where a dummy variable indicating the past colonial 
origins of the country was used as the instrument.  This variable was also found to be 
negative and highly significant in a first-stage regression for corruption in the presence of 
other control variables.  The colony dummy was partly constructed from Demirguc-Kunt 
  10and Levine (2001) for the majority of the countries in our dataset.  Data on colonial 
origins for the rest of the countries were obtained from the Wikipedia website 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Empire).  The results for the two-stage least squares 
regressions are reported in Table 4.  Corruption is found to be highly significant in all the 
regressions for import duty, international trade tax, and the trade-GDP ratio.  Moreover, 
the effects of corruption on trade protection are also substantially larger after correcting 
for endogeneity.  A one standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with 1.23 
and 0.5 standard deviation increases in import duty and international trade tax, 
respectively, while the trade-GDP ratio is reduced by almost 4%.  Both real GDP and 
government expenditure, however, change signs in case of the instrumental variable 
regression.  Both the variables are positively correlated with import duty, negatively 
correlated with the level of openness measured by the trade-GDP ratio, and are not 
significant in case of taxes on international trade.  The change in the signs can be 
attributed to the correlation of the instrument variable used in the regression with the 
other explanatory variables used in the regression, namely real GDP, government 
expenditure, current account balance, and population.         
As Anderson and Marcoullier (2002) have argued, lack of contract enforcement 
adds to the transactions cost between North-South trade and significantly reduces the 
trade volume.  In order to estimate the effect of contract enforcement on trade policy and 
trade protection, we re-estimated equation (1) using both the measures of corruption and 
contract enforcement, along with other control variables. Given the endogeneity issue 
affecting both these indicators, it might be advisable to instrument both the variables. In 
order to do this, we used an index for linguistic fractionalization developed by Alesina et 
  11al. (2003) for about 190 countries along with the colony dummy variable.  Indices based 
on ethnolinguistic fractionalization
1 have been widely used in the corruption and growth 
literature in order to explain differing outcomes in terms of output and investment in 
cross-sectional regressions (Mauro 1995, Easterly and Levine 1997, La Porta et al. 1999). 
Linguistic fractionalization itself has been found to be associated with negative outcomes 
on government policies and quality of institutions.  The linguistic fractionalization index 
came out to be highly significant and positively correlated with the corruption variable 
and negatively correlated with the contract enforcement variable in our first stage 
regressions (while the colony dummy variable was negatively significant in both the 
regressions) in the presence of other control variables.   
Results of our fixed effects IV regressions are reported in table 5. In the presence 
of corruption, contract enforcement is highly significant and positive both in the case of 
import duty and the international trade tax, while it is negatively correlated with the 
trade-GDP ratio.  This can be interpreted as follows: for a given level of corruption, an 
increase in the risk of government’s repudiation of contracts leads to increased lobbying 
by the producers so as to minimize the chances of the government backing out on its 
promises.  The increased lobbying leads to higher protection in the form of import duties 
or trade taxes or adds on to the transactions cost of trade so as to reduce the trade-GDP 
ratio.  One standard-deviation increase in the risk of contract enforcement is found to lead 
to a 1.96 standard deviation increase in the import duty and a 0.91 standard deviation 
                                                 
1 Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. 
The linguistic fractionalization index used here measures the probability that any two 
randomly selected individuals will not speak the same language. The former measure, 
first introduced in the corruption literature by Mauro (1995) is indicative of the effect that 
ethnic heterogeneity in a country has on the State’s redistributive policies.     
  12increase in the level of the international trade tax.  The effect of the risk of contract 
enforcement on trade openness is especially severe, with a one standard deviation 
increase in the risk being associated more than 5 standard deviation reductions in the 
trade-GDP ratio, a result similar to Anderson and Marcouiller (2002).  The corruption 
variable, however, turns out not to be significant in the presence of the contract 
enforcement variable.  Given that the language (instrument) variable is more strongly 
correlated than the colony variable with the level of corruption, the effect of this variable 
dominates in our IV regressions, and renders the corruption variable insignificant (with a 
wrong sign) when contract enforcement is added on to the regressions.  
 
6. Conclusions 
  The study thus provides fresh evidence on the effect of institutions on trade 
protection in particular, and trade policy in general.  This has been done using cross-
country data for a diverse group of countries over a period of time.  In general, we 
conclude that poor quality of institutions, measured by our corruption variable and lack of 
contract enforcement, significantly increases import duties and taxes on international 
trade, and reduces the level of openness, the latter measured by the trade-GDP ratio. 
However, our contention is that the signs of the coefficients reported in the regressions 
are more important than the (absolute) value of the coefficients.  The findings provide 
indirect support for the Grossman-Helpman framework, because it supports the 
hypothesis of increased amenability of the government to lobbying pressures leading to 
higher levels of trade protection.   
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  16Table 1.a: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Corruption 1056  2.383  1.521  0  6 
Contract 
enforcement 




1056  7.989 10.305 0.085 47.821 
Government 
expenditure 




1056 -2.718 6.709  -44.839  29.952 
Population 1056  50580.97  146786.5  239  1230075 
Import duty  1056  10.391  9.254  0  53.082 
International 
trade tax 
1056 13.476  12.867  0  75.317 
Trade-GDP 
ratio 
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Table 1.b: Correlation matrix for trade protection, corruption, & contract enforcement 
 
 Corruption  Contract 
enforcement 




Corruption 1  0.66  0.46  0.53 -0.21 
Contract 
enforcement 
0.66 1  0.55  0.63  -0.21 
Import duty  0.46  0.55  1  0.66  -0.22 
International 
trade tax 
0.53 0.63  0.66  1  -0.09 
Trade-GDP 
ratio 















  18Table 2: OLS regression 
 Import 
duty 























































































1056 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056 
R-square 0.36  0.39  0.08  .40  .47  .10 
*- significant at 10% level; **- significant at 5% level; ***- significant at 1% level; 






  19Table 3: Fixed effects model with time-specific & comprehensive region-specific effects  
 

































No.  of  years  16 16 16 
Average # of countries 
each year 
66 66 66 
Overall  R-square  0.48 0.58 0.26 
*- significant at 10% level; **- significant at 5% level; ***- significant at 1% level; 










  20Table 4: Fixed effects IV model with time-specific and comprehensive region-specific 
effects  
 

































No.  of  years  16 16 16 
Average # of countries 
each year 
66 66 66 
Overall  R-square  0.22 0.52 0.06 
*- significant at 10% level; **- significant at 5% level; ***- significant at 1% level; 









  21Table 5: Fixed effects model with time-specific and comprehensive region-specific 
effects (with contract enforcement)  
 







































No.  of  years  16 16 16 
Average # of countries 
each year 
66 66 66 
Overall  R-square  0.25 0.53 0.03 
*- significant at 10% level; **- significant at 5% level; ***- significant at 1% level; 
standardized beta coefficients in each cell; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
  22